Strategy and Conflict:
An Introductory Sketch of Game Theory
Introduction
Choosing Information Technologies
Probability
Nature as a Player
Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Dividing a Dollar
Application in Political Theory
Applicability of Zero and Constant Sum Games
Two-Person Nonconstant Sum Games
Games with More Than One Equilibrium
Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Noncostant Sum Games
Cournot Duopoly
Nash Equilibria with More Than Two Players
A Cournot Triopoly
The Internet Game
Simplifying Assumptions for N-Person Games: Representative Agents and Symmetry
Simplifying Assumptions for N-Person Games: A State Variable
The Tragedy of the Commons
Proportional Games: The Commuter Game
Drive On! With Many Players
Keynesian Equilibrium as a Nash Equilibrium
Applicability of Nash Equilibrium Analysis
Choosing Information Technologies, Again
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
The Paradox of Benevolent Authority
The End-Point Problem
Deterring Terrorism
Applicability of Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Repeated Games
Repeated Prisoners' Dilemmas
Morality and Self-Interest
The Endpoint Problem Again
Bounded Rationality and Evolutionary Stability in Games
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