33 South Long Point Lane

Fax (215) 895 6975

Rose Valley, Pa.19063

Voice (215) 895-2176

CURRICULUM VITAE

Roger Ashton McCain III

portrait

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

EDUCATION AND HONORS

Louisiana State University, 1960-67, Baton Rouge, La., 70803

Fair Park High School, Greenwood Road, Shreveport, La., 1956-60.

Academic Honors:

PUBLISHED PAPERS AND BOOKS

Books:

Game Theory and Public Policy (Forthcoming, Elgar, 2009)

Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy (South-Western, 2004)

Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth (Kluwer, 1999)

A Framework for Cognitive Economics (Praeger, 1992)

Markets, Decisions and Organizations: Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (Prentice-Hall, 1981)

Papers:

  1.  "Commitment and Weakness of Will in Game Theory and Neoclassical Economics,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 2009
  2. “Cooperative Games and Cooperative Organizations,” Journal of Socio-Economics, 2008
  3. "Cooperation and Effort, Reciprocity and Mutual Supervision in Worker Cooperatives" Advances in the Economics of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms 2008.
  4. "Nonzero Sum Games” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, ed. by William A Darity (Thomson) 2007.
  5. “Welfare Economics,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, ed. by William A Darity (Thomson), 2007
  6. "Probabilistic Equilibria for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies," Behavioral and Brain Science 2006
  7. "Game Theory," INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE, Ed. by Philip O'Hara 
  8. "Worker-Cooperatives and Participatory Enterprises." INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE, Ed. by Philip O'Hara
  9. "Cultural Goods," Throsby and Ginsburgh, Eds, Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, 2006.
  10. “Worker Cooperatives, Effort and  Shirking: A Semi-Effective Game Model" Proceedings, 6th meeting on Game Theory and Practice,” Zaragoza, Spain, 10-12 July, 2006
  11. “Cooperation and Effort, Reciprocity and Mutual Supervision in Worker Cooperatives” Proceedings, 13th Conference of the International Association for the Economics of Participation (IAFEP), Sanctuario de Arantzazu, Spain, July 2006
  12. “Cooperative Partnership of Not-for-Profit and Conventional Corporations: A Proposal” Proceedings, 13th Conference of the International Association for the Economics of Participation (IAFEP), Sanctuario de Arantzazu, Spain, July 2006
  13. "Entrepreneurship, Creativity, and Cognitive Economics” Proceedings of International Conference on Cognitive Economics, New Bulgarian University, Aula Sofia, August 5-8, 2005
  14. "Introduction" to G. R. Stirling Taylor, The Guild State IHS Press, 2004
  15. "The Economics of the Formation of Taste," in Ruth Towse, Ed., Handbook of Cultural Economics, 2003.
  16. "Flexible Learning of Optimal Strategies," SME 2001, Proceedings of IFAC Symposium on Modeling and Control of Economic Systems, Klagenfurt, Austria, Sept. 2001.
  17. "Superfairness and the Case for Access"" International Journal of Social Economics, 2001 This paper won the Literati Club Outstanding Paper award for the journal in 2002.
  18. "Javascript 'Laboratories' and Online Polylog In An E-College MBA Fundamentals Course," Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference on Teaching Economics, Robert Morris College, Feb. 22-24, 2001, 2001.
  19. "An Equity-Based Redefinition of Underemployment and Unemployment and Some Measurements," co-authored with Bijou Lester, Review of Social Economy, June 2001.
  20. “Differences, Games and Pluralism,” Behavioral and Brain Science, 2000.
  21. "Essential Principles of Economics (Summary of Recommended Web-Site)," Journal of Economic Education 2000. This introduces JEE's recommendation of my website for basic economics education.
  22. "The Mystery of Worker-Buyouts of Bankrupt Firms: An Explanation in Terms of Learning by Doing and Specific Human Capital," Economic Analysis. This analyzes bankruptcy and buyouts as a subgame perfect game-theoretic equilibrium. 1999.
  23. "Developing on On-Line Textbook: Question-Led Teaching and the World Wide Web," Journal of Economic Education 1999.
  24. "Defeasible Rationality," Rationality in Economics: Alternative Perspectives, 1998 published by Kluwer under the editorship of Kenneth Dennis.
  25. "Game Theory: An Introductory Sketch with an Information Technology Example," Multimedia Communications 1997.
  26. "Cultivation of Taste, Catastrophe Theory, and the Demand for Works of Art," In Cultural Economics: The Arts, Heritage, and the Media, edited by Dr. Ruth Towse (1996, Elgar) reprinted from American Economic Review, May, 1981.
  27. Genetic Algorithms, Teleological Conservatism, and the Emergence of Optimal Demand Relations: the Case of Learning- by- Consuming," Artificial Societies, edited by Nigel Gilbert and Rosaria Conte (London: UCL Press, 1995) pp. 126-142.
  28. Genetic Algorithms, Teleological Conservatism, and the Emergence of Optimal Demand Relations: The Case of Stable Preferences," Computational Economics, 1994. Items 25,  26 and 29, are derived from a research project on computer simulation of consumer learning processes, with applications to the economics of the arts.
  29. "Some Statistical Results on Predictors of Student Success," The National Honors Report v. XVI no. 2 (Summer 1995) pp. 19-21.
  30. "Consequentialism in Haste: Comments on Baron," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, fall 1993. Agreeing with Baron's objective, a sound consequentialist decision theory, this commentary nevertheless finds his arguments unsound.
  31. "Cultivation of Taste and Bounded Rationality: Some Computer Simulations," Journal of Cultural Economics, v. 19 pp. 1-15. Computer simulations of processes determining demand for works of art based on items 77 and 84 below.
  32. "Cooperation: The Proper Study of Economics," International Journal of Social Economics, 1993. Argues for a new synthesis based on the pervasive phenomenon of complementarity in production.
  33. "Bargaining Power and Artists' Resale Dividends," Journal of Cultural Economics; 1994. Explores whether bargaining power makes a difference to the issue of the efficiency of artists' resale dividends.
  34. "Heuristic Coordination Games: Rational Action Equilibrium and Objective Social Constraints in a Linguistic Conception of Rationality," Social Science Information, 1992, no. 4. Application of ideas from 42, 46, and A Framework for Cognitive Economics to explain the rational basis of custom, government, monetary and linguistic communities.
  35. "Impulse-Filtering and Regression Models of the Determination of the Rate of Suicide," In collective volume edited by D. Lester. An application of the model set forth in item 44.
  36. "Transaction Costs and Labor Management," Advances in the Economics of Labor Managed and Participatory Firms. Transaction cost interpretation of the point in item 76.
  37. "A Theory of Economic Planning for Market Economies: The Optimality of Planning," in S. Bagwan Dahiya, ed. Theoretical Foundations of Economic Planning, Vol. III: Sectoral and Regional Planning, (New Delhi: Vedams Books, Ch. 5, 1992). Delayed in publication for 7 years, this paper lays the basis for the argument in item 66.
  38. "Notes Toward an Apologia for Honors Education," The National Honors Report, Fall 1991. A revised version of a pitch to start up an Honors Program at Drexel.
  39. "Deontology, Consequentialism, and Rationality," 1991, Review of Social Economy. Reconsiders and extends the new concept of rationality proposed in item 42.
  40. "Codetermination and Profit Sharing," Magill's Survey of Social Science (Sept. 1991).
  41. "Models: An Overview," Magill's Survey of Social Science (Sept. 1991).
  42. "Normative and Positive Economics," Magill's Survey of Social Science (Sept. 1991).
  43. "Optimality," Magill's Survey of Social Science (Sept. 1991).
  44. "A Linguistic Concept of Rationality," Social Science Information, summer 1991. A new conception of "rationality" is proposed, which is historically emergent.
  45. "Groping: A Behavioral Metatheory of Choice" Handbook of Behavioral Economics 1992. (Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics). A model of trial and error quasirational behavior.
  46. "Comments," Handbook of Behavioral Economics (Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics) 1992. On a paper by Robert Black.
  47. "Cognitive Science, Economics, and Entrepreneurship," The Journal of Private Enterprise, Volume 7, F 1991
  48. "Impulse-Filtering: A New Theory of Freely Willed Economic Choice," Review of Social Economy, Summer 1990. Extends the model of item 42 and relates it to some philosophical issues.
  49. "Two Fundamental Propositions of Classical Economics and Some Reduced Form Evidence," Journal of Economics and International Relations, Spring 1990. An econometric study. Plausible determinants of labor supply do not "cause" production, which raises fundamental doubts about classical economics.
  50. "Humanistic Economics Again," Forum for Social Economics, v. 19, no. 2, Spring 1990. Further discussion stemming from item 54.
  51. "RATS: An Econometrics Package for Microcomputers." Journal of Economic Surveys, Fall 1989. Software review; with Dr. Ed Sullivan, Fordham University.
  52. "Scenario and Frame Games as Microcomputer Learning Tools and an Application to Undergraduate Economics," On-Cue: Computers in the Classroom Newsletter 1989. Reprint of item 51.
  53. "Scenario and Frame Games as Microcomputer Learning Tools and an Application to Undergraduate Economics," Collegiate Microcomputer 1989. See "instructional innovation" below.
  54. "Bargaining and Some Paradoxes of Sequential Games in Codetermination and Collective Bargaining," in Codetermination: A Discussion of Different Approaches, Springer-Verlag, Ed. by J. Backhaus and Hans Nutzinger, 1989. Why codetermination is productive but not profitable.
  55. "Artists' Resale Dividends: Some Economic-Theoretic Considerations," Journal of Cultural Economics 1989. This proposal can make a difference if capital markets are imperfect, but the impact depends on the details of the imperfection.
  56. "Humanistic Economics: The New Challenge, by Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux: A Review Essay," Forum for Social Economics, 1988. An invited paper.
  57. "Information as Property and as a Public Good: Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Property Rights," Library Quarterly 1988. There is an economic defense for the traditional public library.
  58. "Learning by Doing in Capitalist and Illyrian Firms: A Control-Theoretic Exploration," Economic Analysis and Workers' Management, (Zagreb, Yugoslavia) no. 1-2, 1988. Labor-managed enterprises may be more effective if learning by doing is important.
  59. "Scalping: Optimal Prices for Performances in the Arts and in Sport," Journal of Cultural Economics, June 1987. When tastes are endogenous, long-run profit maximization may require underpricing.
  60. "Fuzzy Confidence Intervals in a Theory of Economic Rationality," Journal of Fuzzy Sets and Systems, Aug. 1987. A formal model of Knightian uncertainty and a proposed empirical test.
  61. "Reciprocity: Anthropological and Economic Theoretic Perspectives," Forum for Social Economics, 1987. The "traditional" economy is both more and less than that.
  62. "Acceptable Contracts, Opportunism, and Inflexible Hourly Wages," Eastern Economic Journal, Fall 1987. An alternative to "implicit" contracts.
  63. "Costs of Transaction and a Theory of Public Policy," Review of Social Economy, Dec. 1986. A transaction cost rationale for fiscal and monetary policy, inter alia.
  64. "Game Theory and the Cultivation of Taste," Journal of Cultural Economics, June 1986. When tastes are endogenous, it is not clear that it is rational to be far-sighted.
  65. "Increasing "Alienation": The Work Environment and the Direction of Technical Progress under Alternative forms of Enterprise," Advances in the Economics of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, v. 3. 1986. Market-guided innovation may lead to working-conditions-using technical "progress" under capitalism. Not, however, under worker-management.
  66. " Comments on Professor Horvat's Essay," Journal of Comparative Economics, 1986.
  67. "The Theory of the Labor-Managed Firm in the Short Run: An Implicit Contracts Approach," Advances in the Economics of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms, 1985. Short-run supply behavior of labor-managed firms does not differ from that of capitalist firms, in theory.
  68. "A Theory of Economic Planning for Market Economies: The Optimality of Planning in an Economy with Uncertainty and Asymmetrical Information," Economic Modeling, Oct. 1985. Fiscal policy is more effective when the targets are made public in an indeterminate-equilibrium model.
  69. "Community and Social Economy," International Journal of Social Economics, 1984. The nature of community and implications especially for the theory of the firm.
  70. "Economics of Self-Assessed Admission Payments for a Museum," with Mary Acker and Robert Acker, Proceedings, Second International Conference on Cultural Economics and Planning, 1984. Requested payments function much like prices.
  71. "Beyond Management: Economics and the Cybernetics of the Firm," Thought, 1983. The firm as information-processor.
  72. "Fuzzy Confidence Intervals," International Journal of Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 1983. Clarifying some formal concepts of number, appropriate for constrained optimum problems.
  73. "Consumers' Decisions for Cultural Services: An Overview," Selected Papers of the Second International Conference on Cultural Economics and Planning, 1983.
  74. "The Theory of the Firm," in the McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Economics, 1981.
  75. "Tradition and Innovation," Economics of Information, Ed. by Leiter and Galatin, Martinus Nijhof, 1981. (Conference proceedings volume). An externality model of innovation with a cognitive rationale.
  76. "Comments on Lancaster," Economics of Information, Ed. by Leiter and Galatin, Martinus Nijhof, 1981. (Conference proceedings volume).
  77. "Rejoinder to Fisher's Note," Review of Social Economy, 1981. The note was on item 81.
  78. "Optimal Subsidies to the Arts in a Shortsighted World," Journal of Cultural Economics, 1981. When tastes are endogenous and people are shortsighted, something much like an externality results.
  79. "Cultivation of Taste, Catastrophe Theory, and the Demand for Works of Art," American Economic Review, May, 1981. Even when people are farsighted, endogenous tastes may lead to discontinuous jumps in demand.
  80. "Empirical Implications of Worker Participation in Management," in Participatory and Self-Managed Firms, Ed. by Jones and Svejnar, Heath-Lexington, 1981. The high labor productivity of participatory firms confounds some proposed tests of theory.
  81. "A Theory of Codetermination," Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 1980. Codetermination substitutes negotiation for opportunism, raising productivity.
  82. "Markets for Art Work and Markets for Lemons," Proceedings, First International Conference on Cultural Economics and Planning, 1980. If good art is complex, signals of the artist's intentions may be needed. Low income is one such signal.
  83. "Critical Reflections on Sociobiology," Review of Social Economy, 1980. Like neoclassical economics, and for the same reasons, sociobiology is a metaphysical mess.
  84. "Igualidad Distributive y Utilidad Aggregata: Un Commentario Posterior," Hacienda Publica Espanola, 1979. Reprint in Spanish Translation from AER, 1972 -- item 99.
  85. "A Tempest on a T-Test: Rejoinder to Seaman," Journal of Behavioral Economics, 1979. Seaman responded to item 85.
  86. "Reflections on the Cultivation of Taste," Journal of Cultural Economics, 1979. When tastes are endogenous and people are shortsighted, discontinuous jumps in demand may occur. Includes the only econometric implementation of catastrophe theory known to me, a model of the demand for wine.
  87. "Comments," Journal of Behavioral Economics, 1979. On papers on economics of the arts.
  88. "Endogenous Bias in Technical Progress and Environmental Policy," American Economic Review, 1978. The market may guide innovations toward an environment-using bias.
  89. "The Characteristics of Optimum Innovations: An Isotech Approach," American Economic Review, 1977. Market-guided factor using bias in a rather general model.
  90. "On the Optimal Financial Environment for Worker-Cooperatives," Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 1977. A rather early proposal for a practical share-issuing labor-managed enterprise.
  91. "Comment on Shinnar," Economics of Scarce Resources, Ed. by Leiter, Cyrco Press, 1977. (Conference proceedings volume).
  92. "Anarchy as a Norm of Social Choice," Economics of Public Choice, Ed. by Leiter and Sirkin, Cyrco Press, 1977. (Conference proceedings volume). Optimality of market outcomes presupposes an agreed-upon initial allocation.
  93. "Comment on 'The Florentine and Sienese Renaissance: A Monopsony Explanation,'" Journal of Cultural Economics, 1977.
  94. "Rejoinder to Lecraw," Kyklos, 1975. Lecraw commented on item 98.
  95. "Competition, Information and Redundancy: X-Efficiency and the Cybernetics of the Firm," Kyklos, 1975. Competition may make for narrower inert areas two ways.
  96. "Induced Bias in Innovation Including Product Innovation in a Model of Economic Growth," Economic Journal, 1974. A model in which the market induces an optimal amount of product- quality-improving technical change.
  97. "Further Comment on 'Smoothing' Through Output Variation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974. Cost curves cannot be simply derived from production functions under uncertainty.
  98. "The Cost of Supervision and the Quality of Labor: A Determinant of X-Efficiency," Mississippi Valley Journal of Business and Economics, 1973. Sometimes it pays not to monitor.
  99. "Consumer Welfare and Product Differentiation: An Agnostic Note," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, 1973. Product differentiation may either increase or decrease welfare.
  100. "Critical Note on Illyrian Economics," Kyklos, 1973. Labor-management should be thought of as collective entrepreneurship.
  101. "Distributive Equality and Aggregate Utility: Further Comment," American Economic Review, 1972. Using Shannon-Weaver information theory to clarify "perfect ignorance," Lerner was right about income distribution.
  102. "Induced Technical Progress and the Price of Capital Goods," Economic Journal, 1972. The first multisectoral model of market-guided technical progress.
  103. "Land in Fellner's Model of Economic Growth," American Economic Review, 1970. Introduces land in a model of market-guided technical progress.

OTHER PUBLISHED WRITING

Book Reviews:

  1. "The Origin of Wealth," by Eric D. Beinhocker, Journal of Socio-Economics, 2007.
  2. "Happiness Quantified," by B. M. S. van Praag and A. Ferrer-i-Carbonel, Journal of Socio-Economics, 2006.
  3. "Beyond Profit and Self-Interest," by R. S. Gassler, Journal of Socio-Economics, 2004.
  4. "Barriers and Bounds to Rationality," by Peter Albin,Journal of Artificial Societies & Social Simulation ) October, 1999.
  5. "Markets and Mortality," by Peter Dorman, Eastern Economic Journal, 1996.
  6. "Aesthetics and Economics," by Gianfranco Mossetto, Journal of Economic Literature, Summer 1994.
  7. "Organizational Capital," by John Tomer, Eastern Economic Journal, 1989.
  8. "Consumer Sovereignty and Human Interests," by G. Peter Penz, Journal of Consumer Affairs, Summer, 1988.
  9. "Planning the British Economy," by Paul Hare, Journal of Comparative Economics, 1986.
  10. "Recent Anarchist Theory," (review essay) the Match,1973.
  11. "Post-Scarcity Anarchism," by Murray Bookchin, Annals of Regional Science,1972.
  12. "Planung Vozu," by Rolf E. Vente, Annals of Regional Science,1970.

Course Outline

"Creative Lives," National Honors Report 1993

Journalism:

Fiction:


Electronic Publications:

PAPERS PRESENTED AND ADDRESSES NEVER PUBLISHED

  1. Commitment and Weakness of Will in Game Theory and Neoclassical Economics, ASSA, Jan. 2009
  2. Extension of the Core and the Nucleolus to Games in Partition Function Form, Not Necessarily Superadditive, Third Conference of the Game Theory Society, Evanston, Ill., July 2008.
  3. Cooperative Games and Cooperative Organizations, presented to the First Research Conference of CIRIEC, Victoria, Canada, Oct. 2007.
  4. Agent-Based Simulation of Endogenous Coalitions: Some Small-Scale Examples, presented to the New York Computational Economics Workshop, New School, Oct. 2007
  5. Marginal Cost Pricing as an Heuristic Rule: an Agent-Based Simulation Approach, to be presented, Eastern Economic Association conference, New York, Feb. 2007.
  6. Game Theory, Corporate Strategy Conference of AMBAC Corporation,Oct, 2006
  7. Coalitional Play in some Three-Person Games: Beyond the Partition Function, International Atlantic Economic Society conference, Philadelphia, Pa, Oct. 2006.
  8. Offer Games and Non-Market-Clearing Nash Equilibria: a Biform Game Analysis and Agent-Based Simulation Study, Conference of the Society for Computational Economics, Washington, D. C, June 2005
  9. Risks of Terrorist Attacks, Hoaxes and the Nash Equilibrium, with Richard Hamilton, M. D, presented Eastern Economic Association Conference, New York, March 2005.
  10. Semi-Effective Games, Second Conference of the Game Theory Society, Marseille, France, July 2004.
  11. Cognitive Economics, Creativity, and the Economics of the Arts, Conference of Association for Cultural Economics International, Chicago, Ill, June 2004.
  12. Cognitive Economics, Creativity, and the Economics of the Arts, Joint Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics and the International Association for Research on Economic Psychology, Philadelphia, June, 2004.
  13. Hybrid Real Estate Valuation Models with Neighborhood Effects: Marrying Geographic Information Systems and Nonlinear Econometrics, with Paul Jensen and Stephen Meyer, Conference of the Society for Computational Economics, Seattle, Wash, July 2003.
  14. Specifying Agents: Probabilistic Equilibrium with Non-Self-Interested Motives Conference of the Society for Computational Economics, Seattle, Wash, July 2003.
  15. Modeling Boundedly Rational Agents: Probablistic Equilibrium with Reciprocity, Eastern Economic Association Conference, New York, Feb. 2003.
  16. "The Contract of Nature: Reciprocity and the Social Contract," ASSA Conference (ASE sessions), Washington, Jan. 2003.
  17. Final Report, Research on Valuation of Land and Improvements in Philadelphia, with Paul Jensen and Stephen Meyer, Report to Comtrollers Office, City of Philadelphia, Feb. 2002
  18. A Cellular Genetic Automaton Model of Dichotomous Economic Growth with a Low-Level Equilibrium Trap, Eighth Annual Conference on Computation in Economics and Finance, Association for Computational Economics, Aix-en-Provence, France, June 2002.
  19. "The Social Economics of Sir Arthur Lewis and the Economic Issues of 2002 and Beyond" ASSA Conference (ASE sessions), Atlanta, Jan. 2002.
  20. "Flexible Learning, Strategy, and Randomness: A Behavioral-Economic Agent-Based Simulation Study," International Conference of Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, Washington, D. C. June 2001.
  21. "Road Rage: Boundedly Rational Learning and Enforcement via Simulated Annealing" Sixth Annual Conference on Computation in Economics and Finance, Association for Computational Economics, Barcelona, Spain, July 2000.
  22. "Toward Sustainable External Finance for Democratic Enterprise," International Cooperative Alliance Research Conference, Quebec, Canada, Aug. 1999.
  23. "Backwash and Spread: Effects of Trade Networks in a Space of Agents who Learn by Doing," Fifth Annual Conference on Computation in Economics and Finance, Association for Computational Economics, Chestnut Hill, Mass, June 1999.
  24. "Economic Trends and the Arts in the Coming Century," California Governor's Conference on the Arts, Los Angeles, December 1998.
  25. "Population Growth and Trends in Demand for Artistic Goods and Services: A Neoclassical Analysis" Conference on Society, Politics and the Arts, Drexel University, Sept. 1998.
  26. "Simulations of Dichotomous Development with Cobb-Douglas and CES Steady Growth Models," Fourth Annual Conference on Computation in Economics and Finance, Association for Computational Economics, Cambridge, England, June 29-July 1, 1998.
  27. "Question-Led Teaching of Principles of Economics on the World-Wide-Web with Javascript, HTML, and Filemaker" Conference on Advancing the Integration of New Technologies into the Teaching of Undergraduate Economics, University of Pittsburgh, May 28-30 1998. (Cosponsored by the Journal of Economic Education and NSF).
  28. "Social Role Learning and the Mysteries of Economic Growth," ASSA conference, Jan 1998
  29. "Localized Romer Externalities and Dichotomous Development: Simulations with a Cellular Genetic Automaton," Fall Conference of the Atlantic Economic Association, Philadelphia, PA, October 1997.
  30. "Cellular Genetic Automata in Computer Simulation of Economic Growth and Development with Romer Externalities and Localized Learning," Third International Conference on Computational Economics and Finance, Palo Alto, CA, July 1997.
  31. "Cellular Genetic Automata in Computer Simulation of Economic Growth and Development with Romer Externalities and Localized Learning: Preliminary Results," Eastern Economic Association, Crystal City, VA, April 1997.
  32. "The Principle of Collaboration as the Centerpiece of a New/Old Paradigm in Socio-Economic Thought" annual conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-economics, Geneva, Switzerland, July 1996.
  33. "Optimal Entry in Information Product Sectors," Second International Conference of the Society for Computational Economics, Geneva, Switzerland, June, 1996.
  34. "Overproduction in the Arts?" Conference of Association for Cultural Economics International, Boston, May, 1996.
  35. "Optimal Entry in Information Product Sectors," Eastern Economic Association Conference, Boston, March, 1996.
  36. "Economic Efficiency: A 'Reasonable Dialog' in Economics," presented, Eastern Economic Association spring conference, New York, 1995.
  37. "Latent Excess Demand in Clearing Auction Markets: A Computer Simulation Study," presented, Eastern Economic Association spring conference, New York, 1995.
  38. "Social Accounting for the Arts: Some Theoretical and Practical Considerations," with Ronald Lefferts, presented in absentia at the seminar on the economics of the arts at the Research Institute of Northern Finland, Rovanienen, Dec. 1995.
  39. "Economics of Transition from State-Capitalist to Cooperative Enterprise," presented, ASSA conference (ASE sessions) Washington, D.C. Jan. 1995. Conversion of state and investor-owned enterprises to a cooperative financial structure described in published paper 69.
  40. "Public Policy for Sustainability," Annual Conference of Sustainable Society Action Committee, Philadelphia, PA, Nov. 1994.
  41. "The Case for Minimal Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Game Theoretic and Cost of Transaction Perspectives," to be presented, International Conference on the Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, Venice, Italy, Oct. 1994.
  42. "A Study of Community," National Collegiate Honors Council Northeastern Regional Conference, Baltimore, 1994. Philosophy, model, and statistical evidence of the formation of community among Honors students.
  43. "Freshman Seminars in Honors Programs: Drexel's Experience," and
  44. "Creative Lives: an experimental computer-mediated Honors colloquium," presented National Collegiate Honors Council conference, Oct. 1993. Presentations joint with students.
  45. "Genetic Programming, the Linguistic Conception of Rationality, and the Rationality of Emulation," SABE conference, August 1993. See published papers 7, 8. and 11.
  46. "Computer Simulations of Cognitively Realistic Consumer Demand Processes," presented, annual conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, May, 1993.
  47. "Cultivation of Taste and Bounded Rationality: Overview and Application of Genetic Algorithms," Presented, Conference on the Economics of the Arts, Venice, Italy, Dec. 1992.
  48. "Competitive Framing," presented, at fourth conference of Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Irvine, Cal, March 1992. Argues that competitive behavior depends upon the decision frame.
  49. "Democratic Rationality," ASSA conference, New Orleans, Jan, 1992. Argues that democratic processes may enhance rationality as rationality is defined in A Framework for Cognitive Economics.
  50. "Mathematics in Economics: Its Role Reconsidered in the Light of a New Conception of Rationality," conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, Bethlehem, May, 1991. Excerpts from A Framework for Cognitive Economics.
  51. "Cognitive Science, Economics, and Entrepreneurship," Conference of Association for Private Enterprise Education, Nashville, TN, April 1991. Excerpts from A Framework for Cognitive Economics.
  52. "Three Views of the Rationality of Suicide," and
  53. "Rationality, Equilibrium, and Encapsulated Competition," presented at Eastern Economic Association Convention, Pittsburgh, March 1991.
  54. "Cognitive Economics and the Events in Eastern Europe and Russia," Second World Conference of Congress of Political Economists, Boston, Mass., Jan 1991. Predicts on the basis of cognitive economics that the Eastern European economies will face inflationary depressions despite "shock therapy."
  55. "The Hierarchy of Need and Moral Economics," presented, ASSA Convention (Social Economics Sessions) Atlanta, Ga., Dec. 1989. The hierarchy should be treated as a developmental hypothesis. Examples from the economics of the arts.
  56. "Impulse-Filtering as a Framework for the Incorporation Into Economic Theory of Insights from Other Social Sciences" Atlantic Economic Society Conference, Montreal, Canada, Oct. 1969. Further extends the approach of published papers 26 and 27. An alternative to "economic imperialism."
  57. "Economic Approaches to Information Policy Issues: An Informal Survey," presented to the Professional Issues Seminar of the American Library Association, Chicago, July 1989. Efficiency provides a better case for libraries than rights do.
  58. "Research and Development as Investment in Technology-Specific Human Capital and Chaotic Dynamics," presented to Pennsylvania Economic Association, Millersville, May 1989. Why do research if you're not likely to "win the race?" It may be profitable anyway.
  59. "Incommensurate Values, Free Will, and Conflicts Among Social Goals," presented, ASSA Convention (Social Economics Sessions), New York, Dec., 1988. Recognition of the role of incommensurate values mends two logical difficulties with standard "normative" economics.
  60. "An Unnatural Theory of Aggregate Supply," presented, Eastern Economic Association Convention, Philadelphia, April 1986. Aggregate supply without natural rates or islands.
  61. "A Theory of Imperfect Rationality," presented, ASSA Convention (American Economic Association Sessions) Dallas, Dec. 1984. Approximate maximization and some consequences of it.
  62. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and the Theory of the Firm," presented, ASSA Convention (Econometric Society Sessions), Washington, 1981. A formal model of opportunistic bargaining.
  63. "Catastrophic Macroeconomics," presented, Atlantic Economic Society conference, New York, Oct. 1981. Multiple-equilibrium IS-LM models, with an estimated investment function.
  64. "Welfare Economics, Merit Goods, and a Republican Polity," presented, ASSA Convention (Social Economics Sessions), Washington, 1981. If the "social welfare function" comes from people's preferences over social states, then merit goods cannot be excluded.
  65. "What Does It Mean to Speak of a Trade-Off Between Equity and Efficiency?" presented, Association for Social Economy, Montreal 1980. When politics are endogenous, there may not be a trade-off.
  66. "Mathematical Models in the Economic History of the Arts," presented, Economic History Association, Wilmington, Del., Sept. 1979. Much potential, little actual role.
  67. "Diagrammatics of General Disequilibrium," presented, Eastern Economic Association, Washington, 1978. Illusory wealth in a Clower model.
  68. "Self-Management and Economic Planning," presented, People for Self-Management, Washington, 1976. They can only be reconciled if planning is indicative, and there is some reason to favor this.
  69. "Two Gap Models with Substitution," presented, New York State Economic Association, Fredonia, N. Y, 1968. Imports as a limitational factor in the long run.

OTHER PARTICIPATION IN PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

OTHER UNPUBLISHED PAPERS FROM RECENT RESEARCH

Emergency Department Overcrowding as a Nash Equilibrium: Hypothesis and Test by Survey Methodology with Richard Hamilton and Frank Linnehan

Some Reflections on the Economics of Preservation of Artifacts of Cultural Heritage

Research on Valuation of Land and Improvements in Philadelphia (with Paul Jensen and Stephen Meyer, 2002)

OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

MEMBERSHIPS: American Economic Association, Association for Social Economics, Eastern Economic Association.

GRANT APPLICATION REVIEWER for National Science Foundation, City University of New York.

 

CURRENT RESEARCH:

Cooperative game theory, extensions and applications in public policy.

Evolutionary game and economic theoretic models, applying agent-based computer simulation methods in many cases.

 

INSTRUCTIONAL INNOVATION

Since 1999 I have created courses in game theory for our curriculum at all levels from undergraduate through doctoral and have played the central creative role in designing a new economics major and two new economics minors, which Drexel University had not previously offered.

Since 1995 I have incorporated World-Wide Web material into my principles classes, focusing more recently on developing interactive material for the web service. This gave rise to papers #18 and #20 and the designation of my site by the Journal of Economic Education as a recommended web resource.

In July, 1991, I was appointed as inaugural director of Drexel University's new Honors Program, and served until July, 1995. In these four years the program built from a beginning with 35 students recruited after August first of their freshman years to a program of about 300 students and through the graduation of some of the first group of freshmen. The program is new rather than innovative, but I have developed university (freshman) seminars and a colloquium conducted by electronic mail, summer, 1993, and a colloquium on game theory, spring 1995, for the program and assisted in the development of other new offerings, including other colloquia.

In Winter-Spring 1995, I created and taught an Honors Colloquium in Game Theory.

In Summer, 1993, I created and participated as leading faculty member in a team-taught, internet-based, distance Honors Seminar entitled "Creative Lives." This seems to have been Drexel's first online course offering.

In early 1991 our department revised its curriculum, proposing a more complete set of offerings. My role in this process was to facilitate and bring together the new non-international economics offerings. (The others were grouped under "International Business.")


During 1982-89 I have developed and experimented with some programs for microcomputer use in the economics classroom. An experiment has been mounted (fall 1989, Drexel university) in which the principles sequence is systematically supplemented with a series of role-playing computer games including a macroeconomic policy game, a resource-allocation game, a game of conglomerate enterprise, and Spudculator, which teaches supply and demand through simulation of commodity speculation. The game programs and supporting data files have been written by me or under my direction. Earlier experiments with Spudculator and a simulator for a small (hypothetical) planned economy had been carried out at Drexel and Fordham. Classroom tests of Spudculator had excellent results. I have also estimated a very small macroeconometric model designed particularly for classroom use and have incorporated experiments with it in both graduate and undergraduate courses in macroeconomics and applied macroeconomics (primarily during my visiting appointment at Brooklyn College), with good results. The TAME (Tiny Annual Macro-Econometric) model ran on a Macintosh Apple, IBM or Commodore 64 personal computer and may be used for policy simulation experiments or forecasting. See Published Paper item 50, "Scenario-and-Frame Games."

During 1978-80 I worked with experimental involvement of undergraduates in projects of original research. Beginning in the winter of 1979, I guided a group of four undergraduates in a project to construct a "cost of living" index for university students and to make some comparisons of cost increases to increases in funds sources. That project was conducted under the aegis of "directed readings." During the spring of 1979 I joined with three other faculty to propose a more formal vehicle for undergraduate research, the Temple Economics Laboratory. The proposal won a prize competition and was adopted as an experimental course for the following year. Under the aegis of the laboratory, a group of three students under my direction successfully estimated a demand curve for enrollment in Temple University.

During 1977-81 at Temple University, I taught experimental courses in the Economics of Organizations, Economics of Technology (twice) and Economics of the Arts.

During 1966-69, I was involved in two experiments with the use of television in the economics classroom. At LSU, closed-circuit television was used simply to enlarge some lectures beyond the capacity of the lecture hall: I was one of seven graduate assistants. At Geneseo SUNY, I was one of three economists who put together a television tape year-long introductory economics course.